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We consider the problem of probabilistic allocation of objects under ordinal prefer-
ences. Our main contribution is an allocation mechanism, called the vigilant eating
rule (VER), that applies to nearly arbitrary feasibility constraints. It is constrained
ordinally efficient, can be computed efficiently for a large class of constraints, and treats
agents equally if they have the same preferences and are subject to the same constraints.
When the set of feasible allocations is convex, we also present a characterization of our
rule based on ordinal egalitarianism. Our general results concerning VER do not just
apply to allocation problems but to any collective choice problem in which agents have
ordinal preferences over discrete outcomes. As a case study, we assume objects have
priorities for agents and apply VER to sets of probabilistic allocations that are con-
strained by stability. VER coincides with the (extended) probabilistic serial rule when
priorities are flat and the agent proposing deterministic deferred acceptance algorithm
when preferences and priorities are strict. While VER always returns a stable and
constrained efficient allocation, it fails to be strategyproof, unconstrained efficient, and
envy-free. We show, however, that each of these three properties is incompatible with
stability and constrained efficiency.
1. Introduction
The theory and application of allocation and matching mechanisms has proved to be one the
major success stories of algorithmic economics. A major challenge encountered is adapting well-
known solutions for complex constraints arising in new application domains. In this paper, we
present a versatile and robust preference aggregation rule that is especially suitable for fair and
efficient outcomes for a plethora of economic design problems especially matching market design.
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It simultaneously generalizes celebrated rules in the literature including the probabilistic serial and
the deferred acceptance rules.
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible objects to a group of agents based on
the agents’ preferences over objects. In applications, these objects could be seats at schools, dor-
mitory rooms, job placements, or kidney transplants. Since objects are indivisible, there may not
be an allocation of all objects that is fair, that is, envy-free, between the agents. One possible
remedy for this dilemma is to consider randomizations over deterministic allocations, which can
restore fairness ex ante. This approach is deeply rooted in the literature on resource allocation
and has gained popularity in recent years. The seminal works of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979)
and Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) provide allocation mechanisms for the case when each agent
demands exactly one object and when preferences are given by linear utility functions or ordinal
preferences over objects, respectively. In this paper, we shall be concerned with the case of ordinal
preferences under two generalizations: first, agents may receive more than one object and, second,
there may be constraints on which random allocations are feasible.
Bogomolnaia and Moulin’s mechanism is known as the probabilistic serial rule and can be pic-
tured as follows. Time runs continuously from 0 to 1. At time 0, each agent starts off by eating
her most-preferred object. An object is considered to be completely consumed and thus no longer
available if the cumulative time agents spent eating it equals 1. Whenever an object becomes
unavailable, the agents who have been eating it switch to their next most-preferred object among
those which are still available. The probability with which an agent receives an object in the fi-
nal random allocation equals the time she spent eating that object. The Birkhoff-von Neumann
Theorem ensures that these probabilities can be attained through randomization over deterministic
allocations. The probabilistic serial rule enjoys several appealing properties: it is weakly strate-
gyproof, can be computed efficiently, and always yields an allocation that is efficient and envy-free
(when the agents’ preferences over probabilistic allocations are based on stochastic dominance).
A tacit assumption in the formulation of the probabilistic serial rule is that all allocations are fea-
sible. On the other hand, applications sometimes require allocation mechanisms to respect various
feasibility constraints. For example, allocating students to courses may be subject to curricular con-
straints that require a student to take a minimal number of courses or courses in different subjects.
Likewise, when allocating donor’s kidneys to patients, logistical and compatibility requirements
impose bounds on which exchanges are feasible. In these examples, one would have constraints on
deterministic allocations and stipulate that a probabilistic allocation is feasible if it can be written
as a convex combination of deterministic allocations that meet the constraints. We will allow for
a more general class of constraints where the primitive is a set of feasible probabilistic allocations.
This of course includes the previous example.1 More generally, it can capture ex ante constraints
on the probabilistic allocation and possibly different constraints on the ex post allocation. Ex ante
constraints can include imposing ex ante stability requirements that a system designer may want to
impose on the outcome. In that case, a probabilistic allocation is feasible if it satisfies the ex ante
constraints and can be decomposed into deterministic allocations that meet the ex post constraints
(see, for example, Ashlagi, Saberi, and Shameli, 2019b; Akbarpour and Nikzad, 2020).
Our main contribution is a generalization of the probabilistic serial rule, called the vigilant eat-
ing rule (VER), which can handle multi-object allocation under nearly arbitrary constraints. For-
mally, it requires that the set of feasible probabilistic allocations is closed. Previous generalizations
of the probabilistic serial rule required that feasible probabilistic allocations are given by con-
straints that form a bihierarchical structure (Budish, Che, Kojima, and Milgrom, 2013), constitute
1In this case, the set of feasible probabilistic allocations is the face of the simplex of probabilistic allocations spanned
by deterministic allocations satisfying the constraints.
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lower and upper quotas (Ashlagi et al., 2019b), or exclude a fixed set of deterministic allocations
(Aziz and Stursberg, 2014). In each of these three domains, VER coincides with the proposed gen-
eralization of the probabilistic serial rule. Despite its wide applicability, VER retains the properties
of the probabilistic serial rule in a meaningful way: it always yields an allocation that is efficient
among feasible allocations, gives the same allotment to agents ex ante who have the same prefer-
ences and are subject to the same constraints, and can be computed efficiently whenever the set
of feasible allocations is a union of polytopes described by polynomially many linear constraints.
Clearly, no rule can be unconstrained efficient or envy-free without restrictions on the set of feasible
allocations.
A class of problems that falls under the umbrella of object allocation is two-sided allocation,
where, in addition to preferences, agents may have different priorities for objects. These problems
are well-studied for deterministic allocation (see, for example, Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). A
standard assumption is that allocations have to be stable, that is, if an agent prefers an object to
the one she has been allocated, the former object is given to an agent who has a higher priority
for it. We will view stable two-sided allocation as a special case of allocation under constraints,
where only stable allocations are feasible. Unlike as when constraints come from quotas, stability
constraints depend on the preferences of the agents and are thus in some ways harder to handle.
In the classical formulation of two-sided allocation, that of marriage markets, preferences and
priorities are strict and one considers only deterministic mechanisms. The most prominent repre-
sentative is the (agent proposing) deferred acceptance rule of Gale and Shapley (1962). It enjoys
several appealing properties such as strategyproofness and Pareto efficiency (when interpreting pri-
orities as preferences). Yet, applications like school choice where priorities are typically coarse, that
is, contain large indifference classes, motivate the search for mechanisms that can deal with this
more general problem domain. There are various reasons for considering probabilistic mechanisms
when priorities are weak. Perhaps the most evident one is that it allows for fairness ex ante, which
may be compromised by deterministically allocating objects. Take the example of two agents pre-
ferring object a over object b. If both agents have the same priority for a and for b, then allocating
a to either agent with a probability of 50% is fair ex ante, while no fair deterministic allocation
exists.
We propose VER as a promising probabilistic mechanism for stable two-sided allocation when
priorities may be weak. There are various ways of generalizing stability to probabilistic allocations.
We consider four different notions of stability that have been considered in the literature, which all
reduce to pairwise stability for deterministic allocations. For each stability notion, we can apply
VER to the set of stable allocations and thereby obtain a mechanism that always yields stable and
constrained efficient allocations. Each of these mechanisms provides a natural transition between
the deferred acceptance rule and the probabilistic serial rule in the sense that it coincides with the
former if priorities are strict and with the latter if priorities are completely flat (and preferences
are strict in both cases).
Contributions We explore the space of desirable rules and algorithms for probabilistic allocation.
In contrast to previous work on mechanism design for probabilistic rules for stable allocation, we
allow the agents to have weak preferences. Our main contribution is a probabilistic allocation
rule called the Vigilant Eating Rule (VER) that applies to any class of distributional constraints,
including ones corresponding to any given stability notion. For example, it also applies to non-
bihierarchical constraints, which are not handled by the generalization of the probabilistic serial
rule due to Budish et al. (2013). It also applies to non-convex constraints such as integrality
requirements. We show that the outcome of VER is efficient within the set of feasible allocations
3
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Constraints Preferences Priorities Resultant Rule
– strict – probabilistic serial (PS) (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001)
– weak – extended PS (Katta and Sethuraman, 2006)
SD-individual rationality2 strict – controlled consuming (Athanassoglou and Sethuraman, 2011)
upper quotas3 strict – generalized PS (Budish et al., 2013)
lower & upper quotas strict – generalized PS (Ashlagi et al., 2019b)
allowable ex post allocations weak – egalitarian simultaneous reservation (Aziz and Stursberg, 2014)
allowable ex post allocations strict – generalized constrained PS (Balbuzanov, 2019)
ex post stability strict strict agent proposing DA (Gale and Shapley, 1962)
claimwise stability strict weak constrained PS (Afacan, 2018)
– dichotomous; two-sided – egalitarian rule (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2004)
integral allocations; single-unit demand strict – serial dictatorship
– strict over bundles – PS for bundles (Chatterji and Liu, 2020)
ex ante stability weak weak EAS-VER
ex post stability weak weak ExpS-VER
fractional stability weak weak FS-VER
claimwise stability weak weak CWS-VER
lower & upper quotas weak weak VER for quotas
Table 1: Overview of rules resulting from applying VER to particular constraints and preference
and priority structures. The combinations which recover mechanisms that appeared in
the literature are stated in the top half. Combinations resulting in new mechanisms are
stated in the bottom half.
with respect to stochastic dominance (that is, SD -efficient). If the feasible set is convex, the
outcome satisfies the stronger property of ordinal egalitarianism. Our results regarding VER are
not restricted to allocation problems. They also apply other collective decision making problems
where agents have ordinal preferences over deterministic outcomes.
We show that VER leads to a compelling rule for stable allocation when objects have priorities.
VER returns a stable allocation that is constrained SD-efficient within the set of stable allocations.
For several properties that VER does not satisfy, we prove that they are incompatible with stability
or/and constrained SD-efficiency. In particular, we prove that even for the weakest stability that
we consider (claimwise stability), the set of stable probabilistic allocations is disjoint from the set
of SD -efficient allocations and the set of weakly SD-envy-free allocations, respectively. For each
of the stability notions S that we consider, there exists no rule that is weakly SD -strategyproof,
S-stable, and constrained SD-efficient within the set of S-stable allocations.
More broadly, we present a generalization of the probabilistic serial rule that can handle a more
general class of constraints than previous generalizations. In restricted domains, VER coincides
with well-established rules (see Table 1). We also show how the VER framework can also be useful
when no randomization is involved or allowed.
2. Related Work
We explore two-sided allocation while relaxing the assumption that allocations have to be integral or
deterministic. In our paper, an allocation specifies, for each pair of agent and object, the probability
that the agent receives that object. This probabilistic approach is important on several accounts.
2Budish et al. (2013) assume that the constraints can be written as the union of two hierarchies of constraints. A
collection of constraints forms a hierarchy if for any two constraints, the set of agent-object pairs they apply to
are either disjoint or one is contained in the other.
3The SD-individual rationality constraints require that each agent’s allocation stochastically dominates her initial
endowment. The endowments are part of the specification of an allocation instance in addition to the agents’
preferences.
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We refer the reader to Aziz (2019) for an in-depth discussion. In short, randomization allows one
to achieve minimal fairness requirements such as equal treatment of equals that are unobtainable
through deterministic allocations. Secondly, probabilistic allocations can also be interpreted as
time-sharing or fractional allocations.
Probabilistic matching market design Although most of the papers on two-sided allocation have
focussed on deterministic allocations, some have pointed out connections between integral sta-
ble allocations and their linear relaxations (see, for example, Roth, Rothblum, and Vande Vate
(1993); Teo and Sethuraman (1998)). Erdil and Ergin (2008, 2017) and Kesten (2010) undertook
a study of school choice with schools having weak priorities. They highlighted that tie-breaking
can lead to a loss of efficiency. However, they focus on achieving constrained efficiency of determin-
istic or integral allocations. Similarly, Ashlagi, Nikzad, and Romm (2019a) consider the impact
of various types of tie-breaking on the efficiency of the allocations. Kamada and Kojima (2015,
2017a,b) and Kojima, Tamura, and Yokoo (2018) consider deterministic two-sided matching un-
der general distributional constraints. These constraints capture several real-life scenarios, such
as restrictions on the number of doctors in a particular region. As noted in the introduction, de-
terministic outcomes cannot capture time-sharing or guarantee ex ante equal treatment of equals.
The deterministic framework also has several other aspects which are very different from proba-
bilistic allocation. For example, the problem of computing deterministic allocations that satisfy
a set of distributional constraints is NP-hard for many classes of constraints (see, for example,
Biro´, Fleiner, Irving, and Manlove, 2010). Considering a probabilistic allocation and then suit-
ably rounding it can be an indirect, but computationally more tractable approach to arrive at a
deterministic allocation (see, for example, Akbarpour and Nikzad (2020)).
Kesten and Unver (2015) initiated a serious study of stability notions and mechanisms for prob-
abilistic allocation under weak priorities. They focussed on a strong version of ex ante stability
and proposed two mechanisms. First, they present the fractional deferred acceptance algorithm,
which returns a strongly ex ante stable allocation. They then modify it to derive the fractional
deferred acceptance and trading algorithm that returns a strongly ex ante stable allocation which
is also Pareto efficient with respect to stochastic dominance among stable allocations. Han (2017)
presented a similar algorithm that returns an ex ante stable allocation.
Afacan (2018) considered a more general model in which objects have probabilities for prioritizing
one agent over another. He proposed a weak stability notion called claimwise stability and showed
that no weakly strategyproof mechanism always returns an allocation that is claimwise stable
and efficient among claimwise stable allocations. Both strategyproofness and efficiency assume
that preferences are based on stochastic dominance. Afacan presented his constrained probabilistic
serial algorithm, which returns an allocation that is constrained efficient among claimwise stable
allocations and can be computed in polynomial time.
All of the algorithms that return constrained efficient and stable probabilistic alloca-
tions discussed above assume that agents have strict preferences (Afacan, 2018; Han, 2017;
Kesten and Unver, 2015). We will not make this assumption and our main results are valid for
weak preferences. Furthermore, our approach is general enough to allow for any type of feasibility
constraints.
When considering probabilistic stable allocations, there are various notions of stability that
coincide the classical pairwise stability notion for deterministic allocations. Aziz and Klaus (2019)
investigate the taxonomy of stability notions for probabilistic allocations and map out the logical
relationships between them.
Caragiannis, Filos-Ratsikas, Kanellopoulos, and Vaish (2019) considered fractional stable alloca-
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tions under cardinal utilities. A fractional allocation is stable if no pair gets higher utility in being
integrally matched to each other than under the fractional allocation. They explore computational
problems of computing stable fractional allocations with high welfare. He, Miralles, Pycia, and Yan
(2018) also considered cardinal utilities and presented a pseudo-market mechanism that simultane-
ously generalizes the deferred acceptance algorithm and the mechanism of Hylland and Zeckhauser
(1979). It returns an allocation that is ex ante stable. Nguyen, Nguyen, and Teytelboym (2019)
consider a mixture of cardinal utilities and ordinal preferences that involve multidimensional knap-
sack capacity constraints.
Extensions of probabilistic serial without priorities There are several papers on probabilistic
allocation when the objects have no priorities. Our model that allows for weak priorities has no
or flat priorities as a special case.4 One of the seminal works on random allocation under ordinal
preferences without priorities is by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001), who compared the random
priority rule with the probabilistic serial (PS) rule. They showed that the probabilistic serial rule
is SD -efficient and SD-envy-free, whereas the random priority rule satisfies neither property.
The attractive properties of the probabilistic serial rule have led to a whole line of work on ex-
tensions to more general settings. Those include weak preferences (Katta and Sethuraman, 2006),
multi-unit demands (Kojima, 2009), endowments (Yilmaz, 2010; Athanassoglou and Sethuraman,
2011), bundled allocations (Chatterji and Liu, 2020) and the probabilistic voting set-
ting (Aziz and Stursberg, 2014). VER is more general than each of these rules and coincides
with each of them on their domain. In other words, we are able to generalize and capture the
key insights that underly the probabilistic serial rule. Apart from unifying and generalizing rules
from important domains, our algorithm provides a conceptually easier formulation of the pre-
viously presented algorithms for specific domains (Katta and Sethuraman, 2006; Yilmaz, 2010;
Athanassoglou and Sethuraman, 2011). This aspect may make it more convenient to implement
these rules by viewing them through our framework which allows imposing additional feasibility
constraints.
Budish et al. (2013) consider probabilistic allocation without priorities. They presented a gen-
eralization of the probabilistic serial rule which allows for distributional constraints that are given
by upper quotas and form a bihierarchy. Fujishige, Sano, and Zhan (2018) extend the probabilistic
serial rule to submodular constraints. In their algorithms, agents continue eating a most preferred
object until some upper quota on a set of agent-object pairs is met. This approach works if there
are upper quotas on agent-object groups that form a bihierarchical constraint structure; it does
however not extend to lower quotas on agent-object groups or constraint structures that do not
form a bihierarchy. Ashlagi et al. (2019b) consider probabilistic allocation with lower and upper
bounds on the types of students for each school without priorities and give a suitable generalization
of the probabilistic serial. Our model captures the constraints considered by Budish et al. (2013),
Fujishige et al. (2018), and Ashlagi et al. (2019b), which are all specified by lower and upper quotas
or submodular constraints.
Our model allows for constraints both on the set of feasible ex post allocations as well as con-
straints on the ex ante allocation. Note that if we are only concerned about constraints on the set
of ex post allocations, we can explicitly list the feasible ex post allocations as the set of alternatives,
and run the egalitarian simultaneous reservation rule of Aziz and Stursberg (2014), which is con-
strained SD -efficient and has been referred to as the appropriate extension of the probabilistic serial
4One of the earliest models that involves cardinal utilities is by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979), who proposed a
pseudo-market rule for the setting. Recent work has extended the pseudo-market rule to handle various constraints
on deterministic allocations (see, for example, Echenique, Miralles, and Zhang, 2019). We focus on allocation
problems under ordinal preferences which also connects directly with the literature on two-sided matching.
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rule to the social choice domain (Bogomolnaia, 2017).5 However, in allocations problems, there are
several advantages of VER. Firstly, the constraints themselves may be ex ante. For example, three
of the four stability notions we consider are defined by constraints on the ex ante allocation matrix
and not by enumerating the set of allowable ex post allocations. Another example is time-sharing
where the focus is on the fractional allocations and not on lotteries over deterministic allocations.
Secondly, even if certain ex ante constraints can be captured by enumerating ex post allocations,
the approach may be computationally prohibitive as one may need to enumerate an exponential
number of allocations.
3. The Model
Let N be a set of n agents and O be a set of m objects. Each agent i ∈ N has a weak preference
relation (complete, reflexive, and transitive) %i over objects. The symmetric and asymmetric parts
of a relation % are denoted by ∼ and ≻ as usual. A preference relation is strict if it is a linear order;
otherwise it is weak. By Ei = O/∼i we denote the collection of equivalence classes of objects induced
by %i. Abusing notation, we also write %i for the relation on Ei induced by %i. A preference profile
%N = (%i)i∈N consists of preferences for each agent.
A probabilistic allocation of objects to agents is a matrix p ∈ RN×O+ such that all columns sum
to at most 1. We will write p(i) for the allotment of agent i, that is, the row of p corresponding
to agent i, and, if O′ ⊂ O, p(i, O′) =
∑
o∈O′ p(i, o) for the probability with which i receives an
object in O′. We say that p is complete if all columns sum to 1 meaning that all objects are
fully allocated; otherwise it is partial. If p ∈ {0, 1}N×O, it is a deterministic allocation. Every
probabilistic allocation can be written as a lottery over deterministic allocations.6 Whenever left
unspecified, allocations are assumed to be complete and not necessarily deterministic. An allocation
p satisfies equal treatment of equals for a profile %N if %i = %j implies p(i, E) = p(j, E) for all
E ∈ Ei = Ej.
We introduce two extensions of preferences over objects to preferences over probabilistic alloca-
tions. Let % be a preference relation over O and x, y ∈ RO+. We say that x (first-order) stochastically
dominates y with respect to %, written x %SD y, if∑
o′%o
(x(o′)− y(o′)) ≥ 0 for all o ∈ O (stochastic dominance)
If at least one inequality is strict, we write x ≻SD y. Secondly, we say that x (downward) lexico-
graphically dominates y with respect to %, written x ≻LD y, if
there is E ∈ E with x(E) > y(E) and x(E′) = y(E′) for all E′ ∈ E with E′ ≻ E
(lexicographic dominance)
If x(E) = y(E) for all E ∈ E , we have x ∼LD y and x ∼SD y and simply write x ∼ y. Notice that
x %SD y implies that x %LD y.
5More recently, Balbuzanov (2019) proposed an adaptation of the probabilistic serial rule for strict preferences, called
the generalized constrained probabilistic serial rule, where the set of feasible ex post allocations are enumerated.
Algorithmically, the results of Balbuzanov (2019) can be achieved by enumerating the feasible ex post allocations
and running the egalitarian simultaneous reservation algorithm of Aziz and Stursberg (2014), which seamlessly
handles weak preferences.
6In fact, one can use the Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem to show the following: if p is a probabilistic allocation
with p(O) = αi for all i, then p can be written as a lottery over deterministic allocations in which agent i receives
either ⌊αi⌋ or ⌈αi⌉ objects.
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We assume that each agent’s preferences over allocations only depend on her own allotment.
That is, for allocations p and q, p %SDi q if and only if p(i) %
SD
i q(i). Moreover, p stochastically
dominates q if p(i) %SDi q(i) for all i ∈ N and at least one agent has a strict preference; p is
SD-efficient if it is not stochastically dominated by any allocation. When X ⊂ RN×O+ is a set of
allocations, we say that p is constrained SD-efficient for X if it is not stochastically dominated
by any allocation in X. The analogous definitions apply when preferences are extended based on
lexicographic dominance. Since preferences based on lexicographic dominance refine preferences
based on stochastic dominance, LD-efficiency is more restrictive than SD-efficiency. If p(i) ∼i q(i)
for all i, we say that all agents are indifferent between p and q.
An allocation mechanism f maps a preference profile %N and a set of feasible (complete) allo-
cations X to an allocation f(%N ,X) ∈ X. For any property for allocations, we say that f has this
property if f(%N ,X) has the property for all preference profiles %N and sets X. For example, f is
SD-efficient if f(%N ,X) is SD -efficient for all %N and X.
4. Vigilant Eating Rules
The probabilistic serial rule, sometimes also called the eating algorithm, was introduced by
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) and roughly works as follows. Time runs continuously from 0
onward. At time 0, each agent starts off by eating her most-preferred object. An object is consid-
ered to be completely consumed and thus no longer available if the cumulative time agents spent
eating it equals 1. Whenever an object becomes unavailable, the agents who have been eating it
switch to their next most-preferred object among those which are still available. The algorithm
terminates when all objects have been completely consumed (in which case the probabilities for
each object sum to 1). The probability with which an agent receives an object in the final allocation
equals the time she spent eating it. The description of the eating rule presumes that the agents
always have a unique favorite object and thus strict preferences. If an agent is indifferent between
multiple objects, one can think of eating from that equivalence class as increasing the probability
of getting some object from that class.
Another assumption in the model of Bogomolnaia and Moulin is that all allocations are feasible.
In applications, this may not be so. For example, when objects are interpreted as seats at schools,
there may be quotas for subsets of agents that give rise to upper bounds, lower bounds, or other
constraints on the probability with which those agents can get a seat at a certain school. Another
way in which constraints arise (and the one we will study later) is by assuming that objects come
with priorities for agents and that allocations have to be stable. Then constraints take the form
“agent i’s probability for objects in O′ has to be at least as large as agent j’s probability for objects
in O′′”.
The challenge in defining eating rules when not all allocations are feasible is to not let agents
eat objects if this would make it impossible to continue eating in a way that results in a feasible
allocation. In other words, we need to ensure that the partial allocation at each time can be
extended to a feasible allocation. Even if the set of feasible allocations consists of all complete
allocations satisfying upper bounds on the probabilities, this cannot always be achieved by simply
letting agents eat objects as long as this does not violate any of the bounds. To see this, consider
the following
Example 1. Assume two agents have the preferences depicted below.
≻1: a b
≻2: a b
8
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Suppose we want to get an allocation p in which each agent gets one unit of objects: p(1, a)+p(1, b) =
1 and p(2, a)+p(2, b) = 1. Suppose additionally that there is a constraint that p(1, a)+p(2, b) ≤ 1/2.
If agents start eating their most preferred object a, they each get 1/2 of a. Up to this point, no
constraint is violated. However, there is no completion of the partial allocation that satisfies the
constraints. The example shows that the Generalized Probabilistic Serial Rule of Budish et al.
(2013) cannot handle certain linear constraints.7
We thus need a more “vigilant” approach. The idea is to let an agent eat an object only if
the resulting partial allocation can be extended to a complete allocation. In general, it could be
however, that agents i and j both can individually eat object o, but not simultaneously. Thus, which
objects an agent can eat may depend on which objects other agents eat (and these dependencies
may be cyclic). Our approach to cope with the above mentioned issues is formalized in Algorithm 1.
It is formulated for weak preferences, so instead of eating objects, agents increase their probability
for objects in the equivalence classes induced by their preferences. We keep track of how much
of every equivalence class each agent is guaranteed, while always ensuring that there is a feasible
allocation of objects which meets all guarantees.
Start with setting all guarantees to 0. At the beginning of each round, we decide for every agent
for which equivalence class she gets to increase her guarantee. An equivalence class E is available
to agent 1 if there exists a feasible allocation that meets all of the previous guarantees and assigns a
strictly higher probability for E to i than her current guarantee for E. Agent 1 gets to increase her
probability for her most preferred equivalence class E1 among those available to her. In general, E
is available to agent i if there exists a feasible allocation that meets all guarantees established in
the previous rounds, assigns a higher probability for Ej to j for each j < i, and assigns a higher
probability for E to i that the current guarantee. Agent i gets to eat her favorite equivalence class
Ei among those available to her. We let the agents increase their probabilities of the classes Ei
we have just determined for as long as all the resulting guarantees can be met by some feasible
allocation. More precisely, if πk stores the guarantees at the beginning of round k, find the largest
δ so that there exists a feasible allocation q which meets all guarantees imposed by πk and assigns
a probability of at least πk(i, Ei) + δ for Ei to i for all i. If δ
∗ is this maximal value, we let πk+1
be array that increases i’s guarantee for Ei by δ
∗ compared to πk and is otherwise identical to πk.
After at most m · n rounds, this process terminates with an allocation in X.
We call this mechanism the vigilant eating rule (VER). Whenever the set of feasible allocations
X is non-empty and closed, VER results in a feasible allocation that is constrained SD-efficient
with respect to X (see Propositions 1 and 2). For feasible sets that are not closed, constrained
SD-efficient allocations may not exist, which shows that our requirement is minimal. If X is convex,
the outcome of VER is ordinally egalitarian (Theorem 4). Moreover, if X is a union of polytopes,
it can be computed in polynomial time in number of inequalities used to describe X (Theorem 5)
and if X meets certain symmetry conditions, VER satisfies equal treatment of equals (Theorem 6).
Example 2 (Illustration of VER). Let us revisit Example 1, where we had two agents with the
following preferences.
≻1: a b
≻2: a b
Suppose we want to get an allocation p in which each agent’s cumulative probability for objects
is 1, that is, p(1, a) + p(1, b) = 1 and p(2, a) + p(2, b) = 1. Suppose additionally that there is a
constraint that
p(1, a) + p(2, b) ≤ 1/2.
7The constraint structure in the example is not a bihierarchy as considered by Budish et al. (2013).
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Algorithm 1 The Vigilant Eating Rule
Input: A preference profile %N and a non-empty and closed set X of allocations
Output: An allocation p ∈ X
1 k ←− 0 (k is the round of the algorithm)
2 N ′ ←− N (the set of active agents)
3 π0(i, E)←− 0 for all i ∈ N and E ∈ Ei
4 while N ′ 6= ∅ do
5 for i ∈ N ′ in increasing order do
6 Fi ←− {E ∈ Ei : there is p ∈ X so that p(j, E
′) ≥ πk(j, E′) for all j ∈ N and E′ ∈
Ej , p(i, E) > π
k(i, E), and p(j, Ej) > π
k(j, Ej) for all j ∈ N
′ with j < i}
7 if Fi 6= ∅ then
8 Ei ←− max%i Fi
9 else
10 N ′ ←− N ′ \ {i}
11 end if
12 end for
13 Compute δ∗ as follows
δ∗ = max δ s.t.
p(i, Ei) ≥ π
k(i, Ei) + δ ∀i ∈ N
′ (agent i eats Ei)
p(i, E) ≥ πk(i, E) ∀i ∈ N and E ∈ Ei (p extends π
k)
p ∈ X (p is feasible)
14 πk+1(i, Ei)←− π
k(i, Ei) + δ
∗ for all i ∈ N ′
15 πk+1(i, E)←− πk(i, E) for all i ∈ N and E ∈ Ei \ {Ei}
16 k ←− k + 1
17 end while
18 return p (as computed in Line 13)
We illustrate how VER works in this example. The order of consumption of objects over time is
illustrated in Figure 1.
• Round 1: In the first round an object is identified for agent 1 that she can consume. That
object is a. Next, we find the most preferred object for agent 2 that she can consume.
That object is a. The algorithm computes the maximum additional amount that agents can
consume from their identified objects while ensuring that there exists a feasible allocation
extending the current partial allocation. At this point we have π1(1, a) ≥ 1/4 and π1(2, a) ≥
1/4. Agent 1 cannot consume more of object a so she has move on to consuming object b.
• Round 2: When the second round starts, we have the following guarantees: π1(1, a) ≥ 1/4
and π1(2, a) ≥ 1/4. In the second round, agent 1 consumes 1/2 of object b whereas agent
2 consumes 1/2 more of object a. At this point, object a has been completely assigned and
agent 2 has to move on to consuming object b.
• Round 3: When the third round starts, we have the following guarantees: π2(1, a) ≥ 1/4,
π2(1, b) ≥ 1/2, and π2(2, b) ≥ 3/4. Now both agents consume 1/4 more of b until b is
completely assigned. At the end of round 3, we have the following constraints: π3(1, a) ≥
10
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Figure 1: Illustration of VER for the problem in Example 1.
1/4, π3(1, b) ≥ 3/4, π3(2, a) ≥ 3/4 and π3(2, b) ≥ 1/4. Since both objects are completely
assigned, the algorithm terminates with the following allocation satisfying all guarantees and
the original constraints.
p =
a b( )
1 1/4 3/4
2 3/4 1/4
We first verify that each step of VER is well-defined and that it always terminates. It is then
clear from the definition that it results in a feasible allocation. The proof proceeds by showing that
agents consume equivalence classes in decreasing order of their preferences and then observing that
in each round some agent moves to a less preferred class or become inactive.
Theorem 1. For every closed set X of allocations, Algorithm 1 terminates after at most m · n
rounds with an allocation p ∈ X.
Proof. First, we show that the optimization problem in Line 13 always has a solution. Second, we
show that from each round to the next, either some some agent is removed from the set of active
agents N ′ or some agent moves to a less preferred equivalence class.
Let k be the index of a round in the algorithm. For the first statement, we have to show that
there exists (p, δ) that satisfies the constraints in Line 13 in round k. If k = 0, this is trivial since
π(i, E) = 0 for all i ∈ N and E ∈ Ei and X is non-empty. If k > 0, let (p, δ
∗) be an optimal solution
to the optimization problem computed in round k − 1. It follows from the definition of πk (at the
end of round k − 1) that (p, δ∗) satisfies all constraints of the optimization problem in round k.
Thus, the set of feasible points in round k is non-empty. Since X is closed, the problem has an
optimal solution.
For the second statement, denote by Fki the set of equivalence classes available to agent i in
round k (cf. Line 8), by N ′k the set of agents so that F
k
i 6= ∅, and by E
k
i = max%i F
k
i for i ∈ N
′
their most preferred equivalence classes. Define Fk+1i , N
′
k+1, and, for i ∈ N
′
k+1, E
k+1
i similarly.
Note that N ′k 6= ∅ since we would not have reached round k + 1 otherwise. Moreover, N
′
k 6= ∅
implies that δ∗ as computed in Line 13 in round k is strictly positive by definition of Fki .
Now if N ′k+1 = ∅, some agent is removed from the set of active agents and there is nothing left
to show. So assume N ′k+1 6= ∅. We want to show that for i ∈ N
′, Fk+1i ⊂ F
k
i . If E ∈ F
k+1
i ,
there is p ∈ X such that p(j, E′) ≥ πk+1(j, E′) for all j ∈ N and E′ ∈ Ej , p(i, E) > π
k+1(i, E),
and p(j, Ej) > π
k+1(j, Ej) for all j ∈ N
′
k+1 with j < i. From the definition of π
k+1 and the fact
that δ∗ > 0 in round k, it follows that p is a witness that E ∈ Fki . So we get E
k
i %i E
k+1
i for all
i ∈ N ′k+1. If N
′
k+1 = N
′
k, it follows from the choice of δ
∗ that this preference is strict for at least
one i ∈ N ′k+1. Otherwise N
′
k+1 ( N
′
k. It follows that the algorithm terminates after at most m · n
rounds. Clearly, the returned allocation p is in X.
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Intuitively, it is clear that VER yields an allocation that is SD -efficient among feasible allocations.
To see this, assume that the allocation p of VER were dominated by some allocation q in X. We can
view q as the result of some eating trajectory different from the one which yields p in Algorithm 1.
Assuming agents eat objects at unit speed in decreasing order of their preference pins down a unique
trajectory for q. Consider the earliest point in time at which both trajectories diverge and let i∗ be
the lexicographically smallest agent who starts eating different objects in both trajectories. Since
q dominates p, i∗ strictly prefers her object in the q-trajectory to that in the p-trajectory. But this
contradicts the choice of oi∗ at that time in Line 8 of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 2. When VER is applied to any closed set of allocations X, it returns an allocation that
is constrained LD-efficient among the allocations in X.
Proof. Let %N be a preference profile and p be the allocation returned by VER for X and %N . For
every allocation q and t ≥ 0, let qt be the allocation where every agent i receives a prefix (according
to her preferences) of q(i) summing to min{t, q(i, O)}. Formally, qt(i, O) = min{t, q(i, O)} and, for
Ei ∈ Ei, q
t(i, Ei) > 0 implies q
t(i, E′i) = q(i, E
′
i) for all E
′
i ≻i Ei.
Assume there is an allocation q ∈ X that lexicographically dominates p. Let
t∗ = max{t ≥ 0: pt(i) ∼LDi q
t(i) for all i ∈ N}
Let i∗ be the lexicographically first agent so that qt+ǫ(i) ≻LDi p
t+ǫ(i) for all ǫ > 0.
Observe that pt
∗
(i∗, Ei) = p(i
∗, Ei) whenever p
t∗(i∗, Ei) > 0. To see this, let E
∗
i be i
∗’s least
preferred equivalence class those with pt
∗
(i∗, Ei) > 0. It certainly holds that p
t∗(i∗, Ei) = p(i
∗, Ei)
for all Ei with Ei ≻i∗ E
∗
i by definition of p
t∗ . Now if p(i∗, E∗i ) > p
t∗(i∗, E∗i ), let 0 < ǫ < p(i
∗, E∗i )−
pt
∗
(i∗, E∗i ). We have p
t∗+ǫ(i∗, Ei) = q
t∗+ǫ(i∗, Ei) for all Ei ≻i∗ E
∗
i by the choice of t
∗. Moreover, by
the choice of ǫ, pt
∗+ǫ(i∗, O) = qt
∗+ǫ(i∗, O) and so pt
∗+ǫ(i∗, E∗i ) = q
t∗+ǫ(i∗, E∗i ). But this contradicts
qt
∗+ǫ(i∗) ≻LDi∗ p
t∗+ǫ(i∗). It follows that agent i∗ moves to a less preferred equivalence class after
securing t∗ of equivalence classes at least as good as E∗i . That is, there is a round k in Algorithm 1
such that pt
∗
(i, Ei) = π(i, Ei) for all i ∈ N and Ei ∈ Ei.
Let N ′ be the set of active agents at the end of round k, that is, all agents who increase their
guarantee for some equivalence class in round k. For every i ∈ N ′, let Ei be as determined by
Line 8 in round k. Since p is the outcome of VER, it follows that p(i, Ei) > π
k(i, Ei) for all i ∈ N
′
Moreover, q(i, Ei) > π
k(i, Ei) for all i < i
∗ (by the choice of i∗) and, since qt
∗+ǫ ≻LDi∗ p
t∗+ǫ, there is
E′i∗ ≻i Ei∗ such that q(i
∗, E′i∗) > p(i
∗, E′i∗) ≥ π
k(i∗, E′i∗). This contradicts the choice of Ei∗ since q
is a witness that i∗ could have chosen E′i∗ instead of Ei∗ .
One can generalize VER by equipping each agent with an eating speed function which deter-
mines how fast she can increase her probability for an equivalence class as a function of time.
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001, Theorem 1) shows that for unit demand object allocation without
constraints, an allocation is SD-efficient if and only if it is the outcome of their eating mechanism for
some profile of eating speed functions. The “if part” remains true in our setting, that is, for every
profile of eating speed functions, VER yields a constrained SD -efficient (in fact even LD-efficient)
allocation. The converse ceases to hold. Consider the following preferences.
≻1: a b c
≻2: b c a
≻3: c a b
Let X be the convex hull of the allocations p and q.
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p =
a b c( )
1 1/2 0 1/2
2 1/2 1/2 0
3 0 1/2 1/2
q =
a b c( )
1 1/3 1/3 1/3
2 1/3 1/3 1/3
3 1/3 1/3 1/3
Every allocation in X is constrained SD -efficient. However, for any profile of eating speed functions,
VER will yield p. This is because at each point during the eating process, every agent’s favorite
object o will be available to her until she has consumed 12 of o.
The reason for the equivalence derived by Bogomolnaia and Moulin is that SD -efficiency and
LD-efficiency coincide in their setting as shown by Cho and Dogan (2016). This is no longer true
in our case as observed above. We can however show that when the set of feasible allocations is
convex, every constrained LD -efficient allocation is unanimously indifferent to the outcome of VER
for some profile of eating speed functions. To this end, it suffices to consider eating speed functions
based on indicator functions. Those result in one-at-a-time-VER, a more flexible version of VER
where at any point only one agent is allowed to increase her probability for some equivalence class.
Clearly, the outcome of VER can be achieved by some instance of one-at-a-time-VER.
Theorem 3. Let X be a closed and convex set of allocations and p ∈ X. Then p is constrained
LD-efficient with respect to X if and only if all agents are indifferent between p and the outcome
of some instance of one-at-a-time-VER on the set X.
Proof. Our arguments in the proof of Theorem 2 go through to show that the outcome of any
instance of one-at-a-time-VER is constrained LD -efficient.
For the converse, assume that p is constrained LD-efficient with respect to X. Our arguments
are similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 8 by Aziz and Stursberg (2014). We show that
if π is an allocation to equivalence classes so that p(i, Ei) ≥ π(i, Ei) for all i ∈ N and Ei ∈ Ei with
at least one strict inequality, then there is an agent i∗ so that the most-preferred equivalence class
Ei∗ for which i
∗ can increase her probability has p(i∗, Ei∗) > π(i
∗, Ei∗). Then, by allowing i
∗ to
eat, we can get closer to our target allocation p and the claim follows.
Suppose we have π as above. For every i ∈ N , let Fi = {E ∈ Ei : there is q ∈ X so that q(j, Ej) ≥
π(j, Ej) for all j ∈ N and Ej ∈ Ej and q(i, E) > π(i, E)}. Let N
′ = {i ∈ N : Fi 6= ∅} and for
i ∈ N ′, let Ei = max%i Fi. Note that N
′ is non-empty since we assume that p(i, E) > π(i, E) for
some i ∈ N and E ∈ Ei. Since X is convex, we can find p
∗ ∈ X so that p∗(i, E) ≥ π(i, E) for all
i ∈ N and E ∈ Ei and p
∗(i, Ei) > π(i, Ei) for all i ∈ N
′.
Now if p(i, E′i) > π(i, E
′
i) for E
′
i ∈ Ei, then Ei %i E
′
i since p is a witness that E
′
i ∈ Fi. Since
p is LD-efficient, it is not LD-dominated by p∗. So either p(i) ∼LDi p
∗(i) for all i ∈ N or there
is i ∈ N such that p(i) ≻LDi p
∗(i). In the first case we can choose i∗ ∈ N ′ arbitrarily. In the
second case, choose i ∈ N so that p(i) ≻LDi p
∗(i). So we can find E′i with p(i, E
′
i) > p
∗(i, E′i) and
p(i, E′′i ) = p
∗(i, E′′i ) for all E
′′
i ≻i E
′
i. It follows that E
′
i ∈ Fi and so i ∈ N
′ and Ei %i E
′
i. The
latter implies that p(i, Ei) ≥ p
∗(i, Ei) > π(i, Ei). We can thus choose i
∗ = i.
Bogomolnaia (2017) proposed a solution notion called ordinal egalitarianism that characterizes
the probabilistic serial rule (that can be argued to be the fairest rule for the allocation of objects
to agents under ordinal preferences). Ordinal egalitarianism is defined as follows: We evaluate any
given allocation by the list of numbers tji , the total probability agent i gets of objects from her first
j equivalence classes, for all i and j. An allocation satisfies ordinal egalitarianism if it is the leximin
maximizer of the signature vector t↑(p) = (tji (p))i,j over all feasible allocations. For any signature
vector t↑(p), we will denote by t↑(p)(j) as the j-th entry of the non-decreasing ordered entries.
We will denote by ti(p) as the signature vector t
↑(p) in which only the entries corresponding to
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agent i are considered. We note that if an allocation satisfies ordinal egalitarianism, then it is SD -
efficient. Next we show that under convex constraints, VER returns an allocation that is ordinally
egalitarian.
Theorem 4. For any convex set of allocations X, VER returns an ordinally egalitarian allocation.
The steps in Algorithm 1 that are potentially computationally taxing are determining the best
object an agent can eat at a given time in Line 8 and the amount of time the current eating scheme
can be continued in Line 13. Both require maximizing a linear objective over the intersection
of X with a polytope. Whenever X is itself a polytope (described by polynomially many linear
inequalities), this can be done efficiently by solving a linear program. More generally, if X is a
union of polytopes, we can solve the problem for each polytope individually and then pick the
best solution (which is the best object oi agent i can eat or the maximal amount of time δ
∗ the
current eating scheme can continue). Note that we treat the number of objects m and agents n as
constants.
Theorem 5. If X is a finite union of polytopes, the outcome of VER can be computed in polynomial
time in the number of inequalities used to describe X.
One of the desiderata when assigning objects to agents is to treat all agents equally. Roughly, this
means that if two agents have the same preferences and are subject to the same constraints, then
they should receive the same allocation. Thus, there are two ways in which asymmetry between
agents in an allocation can arise: the mechanism that determines it is inherently asymmetric or
the set of feasible allocations is biased toward certain agents.
VER introduces some asymmetry of the first kind by letting agents choose their most-preferred
available object in lexicographic order. In general, this order is relevant since whether or not an
object is available to an agent may depend on the choices of previous agents. It is clear that this
asymmetry cannot be eliminated entirely since, for example, two agents may have the same most-
preferred object and only the allocations assigning that object to one of them with probability
1 may be feasible. (This is just the special case of deterministic mechanisms.) However, if X is
convex, whether an object is available does not depend on the choices of previous agents and the
order in which agents choose objects becomes irrelevant. A second source of asymmetry is the set
of feasible allocations X itself. Clearly, if X is asymmetric, we may not be able to give the same
allocation to agents with the same preferences.
These considerations motivate the conditions under which VER treats agents equally. Let i and i′
be two agents. We say that a set of allocations X is symmetric for {i, j} if p ∈ X implies p(ij) ∈ X,
where p(ij) is identical to p except that the allocations of i and j are swapped. Moreover, X is
convex for {i, i′} if for all λ ∈ [0, 1], p ∈ X and p(ii
′) ∈ X implies λp+ (1− λ)p(ii
′) ∈ X.
Theorem 6. Let X be a closed set of allocations and %N be a preference profile. If X is symmetric
and convex for i, i′ ∈ N with %i = %
′
i then the outcome of VER satisfies equal treatment of equals.
5. Stable Probabilistic Allocations
One way in which feasibility constraints can occur is if agents have different priorities for objects
and we require allocations to be stable. How to generalize stability to probabilistic allocations is not
at all unambiguous, however. Various notions have been proposed in the literature, of which we will
discuss four. Then we examine VER as a mechanism for stable probabilistic object allocation under
priorities. Many of its properties follow directly from the general statements we have derived above.
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On the other hand, VER lacks properties such as strategyproofness, unconstrained efficiency, and
envy-freeness. We show that this is unavoidable if one insists on stability.
We augment our formal model by assuming that every object o comes with a (complete, reflex-
ive, and transitive) relation %o over agents, which specifies the agents’ priorities for o. A profile
(%N ,%O) = ((%i)i∈N , (%o)o∈O) consists of preferences for each agent and priorities for each object.
The priorities give rise to a relaxed notion of equal treatment of equals, which only requires that
two agents receive the same allotment if they have the same priority for all objects. That is, an
allocation p satisfies limited equal treatment of equals for a profile (%N ,%O) if p(i) = p(j) for all
i, j ∈ N with %i = %j, cap(i) = cap(j), and i ∼o j for all o ∈ O.
5.1. Notions of Stability
We consider four notions of stability, all of which coincide with the standard (pairwise) stability
for deterministic allocations if the agents’ preferences over allocations are responsive. Throughout
this section, we assume that every agent i has a capacity cap(i) ∈ N of objects she can receive. We
stipulate that for every allocation p, p(i, O) ≤ cap(i). Recall that a deterministic allocation p is
stable if for all i ∈ N and o ∈ O, either
∑
o′%io
p(i, o′) = cap(i) or p(o) %o i.
Our most restrictive notion is ex ante stability, which has been introduced by Kesten and Unver
(2015). It prescribes that an agent i can only receive a positive probability for an object o if
every agent j with a higher priority for o can meet the capacity cap(j) with objects j prefers to o.
Formally, p is ex ante stable if for all i, j ∈ N and o ∈ O,
j ≻o i and p(i, o) > 0 implies
∑
o′%jo
p(j, o′) = cap(j) (ex ante stability)
Thus, ex ante stability requires that j has no justified envy toward i even before knowing the
realization of the random allocation p.
Analogously, one can ask that no agent should have justified envy ex post, that is, after a deter-
ministic allocation has been selected according to the random allocation. This leads us to define p
as ex post stable if
p is a convex combination of deterministic stable allocations (ex post stability)
The third stability notion, called fractional stability, requires that for all i ∈ N and o ∈ N ,∑
o′%io, o′ 6=o
p(i, o′) + cap(i)
∑
j%oi
p(j, o) ≥ cap(i) (fractional stability)
These inequalities originate from the work of Roth et al. (1993), who observed that for determin-
istic allocations, their conjunction is equivalent to stability. Ba¨ıou and Balinski (2000) showed
that when preferences and priorities are strict, fractional stability is equivalent to ex post stability.
Aziz and Klaus (2019) give an example, attributed to Battal Dog˘an, which shows that this equiv-
alence breaks down if one omits the strictness assumption for both preferences and priorities. Our
Example 3 in the Appendix shows that weak priorities alone to break the equivalence.
A motivation for fractional stability under unit capacities, adopted from Aziz and Klaus (2019),
is that if the inequality for a pair (i, o) fails, then i justifiably envies the set of agents with lower
priority for o for jointly consuming more of o than i consumes of objects i weakly prefers to o.
Another reason for considering fractional stability is as a proxy for ex post stability in situations
where it is computationally prohibitive to handle the latter. Since the set of fractionally stable
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allocations is described by m · n linear inequalities, it is typically much more well-behaved in that
respect.
Lastly, we consider claimwise stability, which has been introduced by Afacan (2018). We say
that agent i has a justified claim against j for object o if i has higher priority for o than j and j’s
probability for o is larger than i’s probability for objects i weakly prefers to o. An allocation p is
claimwise stable if no agent has a justified claim, that is, if for all i, j ∈ N and o ∈ O,
i ≻o j implies
∑
o′%io, o′ 6=o
p(i, o′) ≥ p(j, o) (claimwise stability)
Aziz and Klaus (2019) showed that each of our four stability notions implies the ones below it in
the list, while none of the converse implications holds.
5.2. Vigilant Eating on Sets of Stable Allocations
In this section, we study the properties of VER when it is applied to sets of stable allocations. If S
is one of our stability notions, then S-VER denotes the mechanism which, for a profile (%N ,%O),
runs VER for the preferences %N on the set X of S-stable allocations for (%N ,%O), so that
S-VER(%N ,%O) = VER(%N ,X). Most of the properties of VER on sets of stable allocations
follow directly from the results we have proved in Section 4. In particular, for every stability notion
S defined in Section 5.1, S-VER yields an allocation that is S-stable, constrained SD-efficient, and
satisfies limited equal treatment of equals. We summarize these results in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For each of our four stability notions S, S-VER returns an S-stable allocation that
is SD-efficient among S-stable allocations and satisfies limited equal treatment of equals.
Proof. Stability and constrained SD-efficiency of the VER allocation follow from Theorems 1 and 2.
To show that VER satisfies limited equal treatment of equals, let i, i′ ∈ N such that %i = %
′
i,
cap(i) = cap(i′), and i ∼o i
′ for all o ∈ O. We prove that the set of S-stable allocations is symmetric
and convex for {i, i′}. Then Theorem 6 yields the desired conclusion. Symmetry is obvious for all
stability notions. Also, for ex post stability, fractional stability, and claimwise stability, the set of
stable allocations is convex and thus convex for {i, i′}. The set of ex ante stable allocations is not
in general convex. It is convex for {i, i′}, however, as we show now.
Let p be ex ante stable and λ ∈ [0, 1]; let q = λp + (1 − λ)p(ii
′). Note that q(j) = p(j) for
all j 6= i, i′. Thus, it suffices to check envy-freeness for pairs of agents in {i, i′} × N \ {i, i′}. Let
j ∈ N \ {i, i′}. First, if i ≻o j and q(j, o) > 0, then p(j, o) > 0 since p(j) = p
(ii′)(j). Thus,∑
o′%io
p(i, o′) =
∑
o′%i′o
p(i′, o′) = cap(i) = cap(i′). It follows that
∑
o′%io
q(i, o′) = cap(i) and
similarly for i′. Second, if j ≻o i and q(i, o) = q(i
′, o) > 0, then without loss of generality,
p(i, o) > 0. Hence,
∑
o′%jo
p(j, o′) =
∑
o′%jo
p(ii
′)(j, o′) = cap(j). We get
∑
o′%jo
q(j, o′) = cap(j) as
desired. Together with the fact that q(j) = p(j) for j 6= i, i′, this shows that q is ex ante stable.
For the extreme cases of coarseness of priorities and strict preferences, VER coincides with well-
known mechanisms. If priorities are flat, that is, if all agents have the same priority for every
object, every allocation is stable for each of our stability notions. In that case, VER reduces to the
probabilistic serial rule of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001), which corresponds to unconstrained
eating. The opposite extreme is that priorities are strict. Then VER returns the agent optimal
deterministic stable allocation, which is also the outcome of the agent-proposing deferred acceptance
algorithm. Intuitively, this checks out since VER is optimal for agents in the sense that it allows
them to eat their most preferred object available to them.
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Corollary 2. Assume that preferences and priorities are strict. Then, for each of our four stability
notions S, S-VER returns the agent optimal deterministic stable allocation.
Proof. First notice that if preferences and priorities are strict, ex post stability and fractional
stability coincide. We show in Appendix B that the sets of ex ante stable allocations and of ex post
stable allocations are lattices when join and meet are defined via stochastic dominance. The upper
bound (with respect to the join operation) of both lattices is the agent-optimal deterministic stable
allocation, which thus stochastically dominates every other ex post or ex ante stable allocation
according the the agents’ preferences. Since by Corollary 1 the outcome of S-VER is SD-efficient
among S-stable allocations, it follows that S-VER returns the agent-optimal deterministic stable
allocation when S is ex ante, ex post, or fractional stability.
Now consider VER for claimwise stability. Let p be the outcome of CWS-VER for the profile
(≻N ,≻O). We show that p is a deterministic stable allocation. It then follows from the fact that p
is SD-efficient among (claimwise) stable allocations that p is the agent-optimal deterministic stable
allocation. Let i, j ∈ N . In the first round of Algorithm 1 (k = 0), agents i and j eat objects oi
and oj , respectively. (Since preferences are strict, agents eat objects instead of equivalence classes.)
We have shown in Theorem 1 that agents eat objects in decreasing order of their preference, so
oi %i o for all o ∈ O with p(i, o) > 0 and similarly for j. Suppose j ≻oi i. If oi %j oj , then
0 =
∑
o≻joi
p(j, o) < p(i, oi), which contradicts claimwise stability of p. Thus, either oj ≻j oi or
i ≻oi j. Since this holds for all i, j, the deterministic allocation q that assigns oi to i for all i is
claimwise stable. Moreover, q weakly stochastically dominates p. Since, by Proposition 2, p is SD -
efficient among claimwise stable allocations, it follows that p = q. For deterministic allocations and
strict priorities, claimwise stability reduces to stability and so p is the agent optimal deterministic
stable allocation.
Alternatively, one can show that CWS-VER is equivalent to the claimwise probabilistic serial
rule defined by Afacan (2018) and apply his Proposition 4.
In view of Corollary 1 and Corollary 2, we also recover the well-known result that the agent
proposing deferred acceptance algorithm returns an allocation that is Pareto efficient within the
set of stable allocations when the preferences and priorities are strict. Corollary 2 shows that
S-VER results in the same mechanism for all four stability notions in that case even though the
sets of stable allocations are not the same (except for ex post stability and fractional stability).
For weak priorities, all four instantiations of VER are in fact distinct. We provide examples in
Appendix A.
An alternative interpretation of our formal model is that the entities on both sides of the market
are agents who have preferences over the other side (instead of one side being objects with priorities
over agents). Then, instead of considering SD -efficiency for one side, we could ask for allocations
that are SD-efficient with respect to the preferences of both sides, called two-sided SD-efficiency.
Formally, an allocation p is two-sided SD-efficient for a profile (%N ,%O) if there is no allocation
q such that q(i) %SDi p(i) for all i ∈ N and q(o) %o p(o) for all o ∈ O and at least one preference
is strict. For ex ante stability and fractional stability, we can show that VER always returns an
allocation that is two-sided SD-efficient among all allocations, not only among stable allocations.
For ex post and claimwise stability, this is open.
Proposition 1. Assume that preferences are strict. For ex ante stability and fractional stability,
S-VER returns an allocation that is two-sided SD-efficient.
Let us now consider the computational complexity of VER for sets of stable allocations. It is easy
to see from the definitions that the set of fractionally stable allocations and the set of claimwise
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stable allocations are polytopes described by on the order of m · n and m · n2 linear inequalities,
respectively. Thus, Theorem 5 implies that the corresponding vigilant eating rules can be computed
in polynomial time.
Corollary 3. FS-VER and CWS-VER can be computed in polynomial time.
The exact complexity of computing VER on the set of ex post stable and ex ante stable allocations
is not settled. Since the set of ex post stable allocations is convex, it would by Theorem 5 suffice
to describe it by a polynomial number of linear inequalities. For the case of strict preferences and
priorities, this has been done by Ba¨ıou and Balinski (2000) as discussed earlier. For weak priorities,
it is an interesting open problem, as also pointed out by Kesten and Unver (2015). Ex ante stability
can be captured by a set of constraints, each of which is a disjunction of two linear equalities: for
each i ∈ N and o ∈ O, either
∑
o′%io
p(i, o) = 1 or
∑
j≺oi
p(j, o) = 0. In general, solving problems
involving disjunctions of equalities is NP-hard, however.
5.3. Incompatibility of Stability with Efficiency, Envy-Freeness, and Strategyproofness
For each of our stability notions, VER on the set of stable allocations violates unconstrained
efficiency, weak envy-freeness, and weak strategyproofness when preferences over probabilistic al-
locations are based on stochastic dominance. Neither of those shortcomings is specific to VER,
but the consequence of an inherent incompatibility of each of these properties with stability and
constrained efficiency. We address them in turn.
Efficiency Roth (1982) showed that there may be no deterministic allocation that is both stable
and Pareto efficient. Since any ex post stable and SD -efficient allocation has to be a convex
combination of stable and Pareto efficient, it follows that ex post stability is incompatible with
unconstrained SD -efficiency. We prove that this conflict remains even when weakening stability to
claimwise stability.
Proposition 2. There may be no allocation that is claimwise stable and SD-efficient.
Hence, for any stability notion that is stronger than claimwise stability, the set of stable alloca-
tions can be disjoint from the set of SD-efficient allocations.
Envy-Freeness In the absence of priorities, envy-freeness requires that each agent prefers her
allocation to that of any other agent. This definition is no longer compelling for non-trivial priorities
since an agent may legitimately receive an allocation that some other agent would prefer to her
own because of a higher priority for some objects. One definition of fairness in this context is
limited equal treatment of equals, which we discussed above. Another one is that of justified envy.
It applies only to pairs of agents i, j who have the same priority for all objects and requires that i
does not prefer j’s allotment to her own when comparing them via stochastic dominance. That is,
an allocation p is weakly SD-envy-free if for all i, j ∈ N ,
i ∼o j for all o ∈ O implies p(j) 6≻
SD
i p(i) (weak SD-envy-freeness)
Even this weak notion of envy-freeness turns out to be incompatible with claimwise stability and
hence with all stability notions stronger than that. This can be seen from the example in the proof
of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. There may be no allocation that is claimwise stable and weakly SD-envy-free.
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Strategyproofness Comparing allocations via stochastic dominance results in incomplete prefer-
ences. Thus, there are two notions of strategyproofness associated with it. The stronger, usually
called SD-strategyproofness, requires that the allotment obtained by truth-telling weakly stochas-
tically dominates any allotment that can be obtained otherwise. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001)
proved that when priorities are flat, there exists no mechanism that is SD-strategyproof, SD -
efficient, and satisfies equal treatment of equals. Under flat priorities, SD-efficiency is the same
as constrained efficiency for each of our stability notions since stability has no bite. We can thus
not hope for a mechanism that returns a stable allocation and satisfies SD-strategyproofness, con-
strained efficiency, and limited equal treatment of equals, irrespective of which stability notion we
choose.
The weak notion of SD-strategyproofness only prescribes that no agent can obtain a strictly
SD-dominating allotment by misrepresenting her preferences. Formally, a mechanism f is weakly
SD-strategyproof if for all agents i ∈ N and all profiles (%N ,%O), (%
′
N ,%O) with %j = %
′
j for all
j ∈ N \ {i},
f(%
′
N ,%O)(i) 6≻
SD
i f(%N ,%O)(i). (1)
Now for flat priorities and strict preferences, there is a mechanism that satisfies weak SD -
strategyproofness, SD-efficiency, and equal treatment of equals: the probabilistic serial rule. More-
over, the generalized probabilistic serial rule for upper quotas forming a bihierarchy of Budish et al.
(2013) is weakly strategyproof. But imposing stability again results in an impossibility. Afacan
(2018) proved that for at least 4 agents, there exists no mechanism that is weakly SD-strategyproof
and always returns a claimwise stable and constrained SD -efficient allocation. We extend his result
to the remaining three stability notions. That is, for any stability notion in our list, no mechanism is
jointly weakly SD -strategyproof, stable, and constrained efficient (with respect to the set of stable
allocations). Note that constrained efficiency becomes weaker as stability becomes stronger, since
the set of stable allocations becomes smaller. Thus, none of these statements implies the other.
Our proof does not rely on weak preferences and requires only 3 agents.
Proposition 4. No mechanism satisfies weak SD-strategyproofness, S-stability, and S-constrained
efficiency for S ∈ {ex ante, ex post, FS} even if preferences are strict.
All the properties are needed for the conclusion of Proposition 4. VER satisfies S-stability and
S-constrained efficiency. Ignoring the priorities and running the probabilistic serial rule gives a
mechanism that is weakly SD-strategyproof and efficient (and thus S-constrained efficient), but
not S-stable. The deferred acceptance algorithm with lexicographic tie-breaking of priorities is SD -
strategyproof and S-stable. For ex post stability, fractional stability, and claimwise stability, one
can simultaneously achieve limited equal treatment of equals by breaking ties uniformly at random.
5.4. Comparison of Probabilistic Allocation Mechanisms
We discuss other mechanisms presented in the literature. Since most of them have only been defined
for agents with strict preferences, we assume that preferences are strict for the comparison. We have
already discussed the probabilistic serial rule in the introduction. Except for the first mechanism
(random priority), all the other mechanism are extensions of the deferred acceptance algorithm
that is typically defined for strict preferences and strict priorities (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Roth,
2008) and which returns an allocation that is stable.
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Random Priority (or random serial dictatorship) chooses an ordering of the agents uniformly at
random and then lets agents pick their most preferred object among the ones remaining in that
order. (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Aziz, Brandt, and Brill, 2013a). The rule does not take
into account of the priorities of the objects. For the basic assignment problem, random priority
is known to be strategyproof. It satisfies equal treatment of equals but is not SD-efficient or SD -
envy-free (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001). If the priority order is chosen deterministically, then
SD-efficiency is regained, but equal treatment of equals is lost.
Deferred acceptance with lexicographic tie-breaking A simple adaptation of the deferred accep-
tance algorithm to the case of weak priorities is to break the ties and then run deferred acceptance.
If the tie-breaking is pre-determined, for example lexicographically over agents, and thus does not
depend on the agents’ preferences, the resulting mechanism is strategyproof. Moreover, it returns
a deterministic allocation that is stable and hence ex ante stable. However, it is not SD-efficient
even among deterministic stable allocations. Like any other mechanism that returns deterministic
allocations, it also violates limited equal treatment of equals.
Deferred acceptance with random tie-breaking Another natural approach is to break ties in
the priorities uniformly at random and then run deferred acceptance. Afacan (2018) referred to
this extension as probabilistic deferred acceptance. In order to compute the random allocation,
we need to take the mean of the outcomes over all possible tie-breakings. Under flat priorities,
probabilistic deferred acceptance is equivalent to random priority. Since the latter is well-known to
violate SD-efficiency, it follows that probabilistic deferred acceptance does not satisfy constrained
SD-efficiency.
Fractional deferred acceptance and trading Kesten and Unver (2015) presented the fractional
deferred acceptance and trading mechanism, which returns an allocation that is strongly ex ante
stable and SD-efficient constrained to the set of strongly ex ante stable allocations. It is different
from the probabilistic serial rule under flat priorities and thus also from VER.
Constrained probabilistic serial Afacan (2018) introduced the constrained probabilistic serial rule,
which is an adaptation of the probabilistic serial rule that obtains a claimwise stable allocation.
Because of the simplicity of the constraints imposed by claimwise stability, this algorithm does not
need to look ahead to check when an agent should stop eating a particular object. Suppose an
agent i starts eating an object o. At that point, we put an upper bound on all agents j who have
lower priority for o than i. If j had been eating o all the time while i was eating more preferred
objects, we can stop j from eating more. If j had been eating o only part of the time, we put
a limit on how much j can eat o. The upper limit is equal to the amount of time i was eating
objects weakly more preferred objects. The constrained probabilistic serial rule can be viewed as
a careful version of the probabilistic serial rule that takes stability constraints into consideration
dynamically. By contrast, VER for claimwise stability makes look ahead checks to see how much
of an object an agent can eat before she needs to not violate stability. One can show that in this
case, the look ahead checks are not necessary and both mechanisms coincide.
Table 2 summarizes the properties satisfied by various mechanisms.
8The deferred acceptance algorithm with lexicographic tie-breaking satisfies ex post stability and all weaker stability
notions. It violates ex ante stability, however.
9The fractional deferred acceptance and trading algorithm violates S-constrained SD-efficiency when S is ex post
stability or any weaker stability notion. It satisfies SD-efficiency constrained to the set of ex ante stable allocations,
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S-VER
probabilistic random deferred acceptance deferred acceptance fractional deferred
serial priority (lexicographic) (uniform) acceptance and trading
S-stability + – – +8 + +
S-constrained SD-efficiency + + – – – –9
SD-efficiency – + – – – –
SD-envy freeness – + – – – –
weak SD-envy freeness – + + – – –
limited equal treatment of equals + + + + – +
Table 2: Summary of the properties satisfied by the allocation mechanisms discussed in Section 5.4.
S may stand for each of the four stability notions we define in Section 5.1. In order to
enable a comparison of all rules, we assume that preferences are strict.
5.5. Two-sided Matching Markets
We consider the classic two-sided matching setting in which both sides have preferences, as it is
the case in marriage markets, for example. Framed in our context, we can regard the objects in
O as agents who view the entities in N as objects. We can apply VER to the problem with two-
sided preferences and let both sides eat simultaneously. This view of two-sided eating is promising
because many mechanisms for two-sided matching problems are asymmetric in that they treat the
two sides differently. For example, in the deferred acceptance algorithm, one side proposes and the
other side accepts or rejects. The general perspective of VER allows both sides to eat simultane-
ously. This perspective gives us the following corollary. If we view both sides as agents, then, in
view of Theorem 2, VER immediately achieves constrained two-sided SD-efficiency. The perspec-
tive of two-sided eating also helps us provide a generalization of the egalitarian rule proposed by
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004) for two-sided matching with dichotomous preferences. We observe
that if both sides have dichotomous preferences, and we do not impose any stability constraint,
then VER is equivalent to the egalitarian rule of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004). VER, on the
other hand, easily applies to both sides have strict or weak preference relations.10
6. Accommodating Other Types of Constraints
We discuss some other concrete classes of constraints that our VER can handle.
Distributional constraints on the ex ante allocations As mentioned before, VER can be applied
in conjunction with any kind of feasibility constraints on the ex ante allocations. For example, a
natural and general family of constraints is to impose lower and upper bounds on the cumulative
probability a subset of agents can obtain from a subset of objects. These types of constraints
capture physical constraints (among a set of objects, only a certain number can be allocated) and
diversity constraints (at most a certain proportion of units of an object can be consumed by agents
of a certain type, or even constraints on the allowed proportions of agents types consuming a set
of objects).
Constraints on deterministic allocations As mentioned in the introduction, ex post constraints,
that is, constraints on deterministic allocations, can be expressed as ex ante constraints on the set
of probabilistic allocations by taking only those allocations to be feasible which can be decomposed
however.
10Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004) showed that under dichotomous preferences, core stability, ex ante efficiency, and
ex post efficiency are equivalent.
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into deterministic allocations satisfying the ex post constraints. In this way, one can, for example,
capture upper and lower bounds on the number of objects a subset of agents can receive from some
subset of objects. One instance of this are bihierarchical constraints on deterministic allocations of
the type studied by Budish et al. (2013). Similarly, one can formulate diversity constraints, which
put bounds on the fraction of objects from within some subset that are assigned to a certain subset
of agents.
Ex post constraints can be combined with possibly different ex ante constraints on probabilistic
allocations. For example, one may stipulate that the ex ante constraints hold exactly, while the
ex post constraints only need to be satisfied approximately. Akbarpour and Nikzad (2020) show
that if the ex ante and ex post constraints are the same, then any allocation satisfying the ex
ante constraints can be decomposed into deterministic allocations that approximately achieve the
constraints. Hence, in that case, there is little need to impose additional constraints which guarantee
that a decomposition into deterministic allocations satisfying the constraints exists.
Allocation with endowments VER can be applied to problems in which agents have
endowments to obtain individually rational and possibly more efficient re-allocations.
Athanassoglou and Sethuraman (2011) presented the controlled consuming (CC) algorithm, which
can be viewed as an extension of the probabilistic serial rule. It ensures that each agent gets an allo-
cation she weakly prefers to her endowment with respect to stochastic dominance. The requirement
of SD-individual rationality can be easily embedded in our framework by using a linear number
of inequalities for each agent. Hence, we can use linear programming to obtain a convenient and
simple way of capturing the CC algorithm of Athanassoglou and Sethuraman (2011). In principle,
we can even combine individual rationality constraints as well as priorities.
Deterministic and integral allocations Our approach has been framed in the context of random-
ization or time sharing. However, it is also applicable to cases when no randomization is involved
or allowed by rendering all non-deterministic allocations infeasible. Note that then the δ incre-
ment in the probability of an agent for an object (cf. Algorithm 1, Line 13) always has to be
one. This ensures that an agent either gets an object with probability one or zero. Not allowing
probabilistic allocations under feasibility constraints may render many problems NP-hard and thus
computationally intractable, however. We note that for the house allocation setting in which want
an integral allocation (Svensson, 1999), VER coincides with the serial dictatorship rule.
Welfare requirements If the agents additionally have cardinal preferences over the objects, then
minimum social welfare guarantees can also be treated as feasibility constraints.
7. Extension Beyond Allocation Problems
The VER framework is not restricted to allocation problems. It applies just as
well to other settings where fractional or probabilistic outcomes are feasible, such
as social choice (Bogomolnaia, Moulin, and Stong, 2005; Brandt, 2017), coalition for-
mation (Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002; Aziz, Brandt, and Harrenstein, 2013b), net-
works (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), and other models discussed by So¨nmez (1999). In this
section, we discuss how to extend our model to capture these applications.
Instead of a set of objects, we now consider an abstract set of alternatives A and each agent has a
preference relation over A. An outcome is an element of RA+. The agents’ preferences over outcomes
are again based on stochastic dominance. By a problem we denote a pair (%N ,X), where %N is a
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preference profile and X ⊂ RA+ is a non-empty set of feasible outcomes. As before, a mechanism f
maps a problem (%N ,X) to an outcome f(%N ,X) ∈ X.
A generalization of VER then works as follows: in each round, agents are addressed in lexi-
cographic order as in Algorithm 1. When it is agent i’s turn, we determine i’s most preferred
alternative ai whose probability can still be increased (while also increasing the probability for
alternatives aj with j < i). Having determined ai for every agent i, we find the maximal δ so
that the probability for all ai can be increased by at least δ. Note that the probability of every
alternative ai is increased by the same amount independently of how many agents nominate ai.
This version of VER can address several classes of problems.
(i) Probabilistic voting Our abstract model immediately captures probabilistic voting (see,
for example, Brandt, 2019) where voters have preferences over the alternatives A and an
outcome is a probability distribution over the alternatives. That is, X = ∆(A) ⊂ RA+. In this
context, VER coincides with the ESR rule of Aziz and Stursberg (2014).
(ii) Participatory budgeting The probabilistic voting setting can also be inter-
preted as determining the share of the budget allocated to each of the alterna-
tives (Airiau, Aziz, Caragiannis, Kruger, Lang, and Peters, 2019). Since our model allows
for arbitrary constraints, it can capture natural constraints such as enforcing lower bounds
(reflecting the minimum funding required) on alternatives that get at least some funding.
(iii) Probabilistic allocation with bundles Let O be a set of objects and assume every agent
i has a preference relation %ˆi over subsets of O (see, for example, Chatterji and Liu, 2020).
A deterministic allocation of objects to agents is an ordered N -partition of objects (which
may include empty sets). Let A be the set of all such partitions. By a(i) we denote the set
of objects agent i receives in the allocation a. The preference relation %i over A has a %i b if
and only if a(i) %ˆi b(i) for all a, b ∈ A. A random allocation is an element of the unit simplex
∆(A) ⊂ RA+ and X ⊂ ∆(A) specifies a set of feasible probabilistic allocations.
(iv) Fractional allocation of divisible objects Again, let O be a set of objects and assume
every agent i has a preference relation %ˆi over O. The set of alternatives is A = N ×O. The
preference relation %i over A has (i, o) %i (i, o
′) for all o, o′ ∈ O with o %ˆi o
′ and (j, o) tied as
the least preferred alternative whenever j 6= i. A fractional allocation is an element x ∈ RA+
so that
∑
i∈N x(i, o) ≤ 1 for all o ∈ O. A set X of fractional allocations specifies a set of
feasible fractional allocations.
(v) Two-sided random matching Let N1 and N2 be disjoint sets of agents. Each agent i ∈ N1
has a preference relation %ˆi over agents in N2 and likewise for agents in N2. A deterministic
matching is a subset µ of N1×N2 such that (i, j), (i, j
′) ∈ µ implies j = j′ and (i, j), (i′ , j) ∈ µ
implies i = i′. Let A be the set of all deterministic matchings. The preference relation %i of
i ∈ N1 over A has µ %i µ
′ if and only if (i, j) ∈ µ and (i, j′) ∈ µ′ with j %ˆi j
′ or (i, j) ∈ µ′
for no j ∈ N2; preferences for agents in N2 are defined analogously. A random matching is
an element of the unit simplex ∆(A) and X specifies a set of feasible random matchings.
8. Discussion
We presented a general and robust rule that applies to any closed set of feasibility constraints. If
the feasible set is a finite union of polytopes, the outcome of VER can be computed in polynomial
time in the number of inequalities used to describe the feasible set. If the set is convex, we showed
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that VER satisfies compelling fairness properties. As a detailed case study, we showed how VER
applies to constraints capturing stability concepts leads to compelling stable allocation rules.
In the paper, we assumed that agents have weak preference orders over objects. VER and its
properties extend to the case where the agents’ preferences are partial orders. The change that
is required is the same that Katta and Sethuraman (2006) suggested for extending the extended
probabilistic serial rule to partial orders. Instead of trying to increase the probability for most
preferred objects, agents try to increase the probability for those objects that are not strictly
dominated by any other objects.
We mentioned that VER can be generalized by introducing eating speed functions for agents
and considered the class one-at-a-time VER as a special case. An interesting instance of one-at-a-
time-VER is the vigilant priority rule (Algorithm 2 in Appendix C): fix some order of the agents;
the first agent in that order increases the probability guarantee for each of her equivalence classes
in order of her preference by as much as possible; once no further increase is possible for the first
agent, it is the second agent’s turn to increase all of her guarantees by as much as possible; we
proceed in the same way for the remaining agents.
This way of eating in the vigilant priority rule does not affect the constrained LD-efficiency and
computational properties of the rule. The rule is clearly unfair to agents who come later in the
order. For particular subdomains (including ones in which the agents cannot affect which allocations
are feasible), the vigilant random priority rule is SD-strategyproof. An interesting question is to
understand the types of feasibility constraints under which the vigilant random priority rule remains
strategyproof. Note that if we choose the order of agents uniformly at random, then the rule loses
its ex ante SD -efficiency property. The reason is that it coincides with the classic random priority
rule (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001) in the assignment domain, which is well-known to violate
SD-efficiency.
As we endeavor to apply the theory of fair allocation and market design to facilitate applications,
it is critical to come up with robust approaches that can flexibly handle domain-specific constraints.
In this paper, we have proposed an approach that is especially well-suited for settings with ordinal
preferences. We hope that the framework, methodology and rule presented can be useful for new
application domains.
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APPENDIX
A. Omitted Proofs and Examples
Theorem 4. For any convex set of allocations X, VER returns an ordinally egalitarian allocation.
Proof. Consider an allocation q that is OE and an allocation p that is returned by VER. Consider
t↑(q) = (tji (q))i,j the signature vector of q and t
↑(p) = (tji (p))i,j the signature vector of p.
Consider that during the run of VER, lower bound constraints of the following form are added:
p(Eji ) ≥ λ. The set of such constraints can alternatively be written as lower bounds on the upper
contour set as follows: p(
⋃j
ℓ=1E
ℓ
i ) ≥ λ
′. Equivalently, they can be written as tji ≥ λ
′. At the start
of round k, we denote by g(i, k) the number of the first equivalence class E
g(i,k)
i of agent i for which
the lower bound has not been fixed.
We prove by induction on the rounds k of the algorithm that VER finds the largest s such that
t
g(i,k)
i ≥ s and that the following values are present in t
↑(q): mini′∈N p(
⋃g(i′,k)
ℓ=1 E
ℓ
i′)) as well as
p(
⋃k′
ℓ=1E
ℓ
i′)) for i ∈ N and k
′ < g(i′, k).
For k = 0, in the first round, VER tries to maximizes the lower bound on E
g(i,1)
i for all i ∈ N .
Suppose that p1(E
g(i,1)
i ) ≥ λ
′ for all i ∈ N . Then λ′ is by definition δ∗ as computed by VER. It
also follows that for all i ∈ N , p1(Eji ) = 0 for all j < g(i, 1). Hence, we have established that the
minimum non-zero entry in the vector t↑(p) is the same as the minimum non-zero entry in vector
t↑(q). By convexity of the feasible region it follows that it is not possible to have an allocation
in which p(
⋃j
ℓ=1E
ℓ
i ) > 0 for any j < g(i, 1). Therefore, the corresponding entries t
ℓ
i = 0 are also
entries in t↑(q).
Now suppose k rounds have passed. By the induction hypothesis, for each k′ ≤ k, t
g(i,k′)
i is
present in the vector t↑(q). We also note that VER has fixed a weight for each of
⋃j
ℓ=1E
ℓ
i where
j < g(i, k +1). At this point, VER computes the largest δ that can be additionally guaranteed for
each E
g(i,k+1)
i . Equivalently, it computes the largest s such that p(
⋃g(i,k+1)
ℓ=1 E
ℓ
i ) ≥ s for all i ∈ N .
Then mini′∈N p(
⋃g(i′,k+1)
ℓ=1 E
ℓ
i′)) is the optimised weight of the next heavy upper contour set. Hence
mini′∈N p(
⋃g(i′,k+1)
ℓ=1 E
ℓ
i′)) is present in t
↑(q).
Theorem 5. If X is a finite union of polytopes, the outcome of VER can be computed in polynomial
time in the number of inequalities used to describe X.
Proof. Let X =
⋃s
r=1 Pr so that Pr is a polytope for each r. The only computationally non-trivial
steps are determining the set Fi in Line 8 and the computation of δ
∗ in Line 13.
First, observe that given a round k of the algorithm, an agent i, an equivalence class E ∈ Ei, and
a polytope Pr, the problem
ǫ∗ = max ǫ s.t.
q(j, Ej) ≥ p
k(j, Ej) + ǫ for all j ∈ N
′ with j < i
q(i, E) ≥ pk(i, E) + ǫ
q(j, E′) ≥ pk(j, E′) for all j ∈ N and E′ ∈ Ej
q ∈ Pr
can be solved in polynomial time in the number of linear inequalities used to describe Pr. If ǫ
∗ > 0,
agent i can increase her probability for E. By solving this problem for every r and every equivalence
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class E ∈ Ei, we can determine the most-preferred equivalence class Ei of which agent i can increase
her share in polynomial time in the number of inequalities used to describe X.
Second, the linear program
δ∗r = max δ s.t.
q(i, Ei) ≥ p
k(i, Ei) + δ for all i ∈ N
′
q(i, E) ≥ pk(i, E) for all i ∈ N and E ∈ Ei
q ∈ Pr
can be solved in polynomial time for every Pr. Since δ
∗ = maxr δ
∗
r , the value of δ
∗ in Line 13 can
be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 1 ensures that the number of iterations of the while-loop in Line 4 is bounded by
m · n.
Theorem 6. Let X be a closed set of allocations and %N be a preference profile. If X is symmetric
and convex for i, i′ ∈ N with %i = %
′
i then the outcome of VER satisfies equal treatment of equals.
Proof. Let p be the outcome of VER for the set X and the profile %N . We prove by induction
that for each round k of Algorithm 1, πk(i, E) = πk(i′, E) for all E ∈ Ei = E
′
i . It then follows that
p(i, E) = p(i′, E) for all E ∈ Ei.
For k = 0, this is clear since π0(j, E) = 0 for all j ∈ N and E ∈ Ei. Now let k be arbitrary and
assume that πk(i, E) = πk(i′, E) for all E ∈ Ei. Let N
′ be the set active agents at the beginning of
round k. We show that Fi = Fi′ , where the Fj are determined as in Line 8.
Assume that i < i′. Since X is symmetric for i and i′, it follows that Fi′ ⊆ Fi. If Fi = ∅, we
are done. Otherwise, let j = max{j′ ∈ N ′ : j′ < i′ and Fj′ 6= ∅} (note that j ≥ i). By definition
of Ej , there is an allocation p ∈ X such that p(j
′, E) ≥ πk(j′, E) for all j′ ∈ N and E ∈ Ej′ and
p(j′, o′j) > π
k(j′, Ej′) for all j
′ ∈ N ′ with j′ ≤ j and Fj′ 6= ∅. Since X is symmetric and convex for i
and i′, the allocation p′ = 12p+
1
2p
(ii′) is in X. Thus defined, p′ satisfies the constraints on p above.
For j′ 6= i, i′, this is obvious since p′(j′) = p(j′). For i and i′, it follows from p(i, Ei) > π
k(i, Ei) and
πk(i, E) = πk(i′, E). Clearly, p′(i) = p′(i′) and so p′(i′, Ei) > π
k(i′, Ei). It follows that Ei ∈ Fi′ .
Thus, Ei = Ei′ and so π
k+1(i, E) = πk+1(i′, E) for all E ∈ Ei.
Proposition 1. Assume that preferences are strict. For ex ante stability and fractional stability,
S-VER returns an allocation that is two-sided SD-efficient.
Proof. First we consider fractional stability. We show that on the set of fractionally stable al-
locations, (one-sided) constrained SD-efficiency implies two-sided SD-efficiency. Then the claim
follows from Corollary 1. Let p an allocation that is constrained SD-efficient among fractionally
stable allocations. Assume that q 6= p two-sided stochastically dominates p. Frist, observe that
q is fractionally stable since the inequalities defining fractional stability are preserved under im-
provements with respect to stochastic dominance. By assumption, all agents weakly prefer q to
p according to stochastic dominance. Since q 6= p and preferences are strict, this preference is
strict for at least one agent. In summary, q is a fractionally stable allocation that stochastically
dominates p, which is a contradiction.
Ex ante stability requires more work. Let (≻N ,%O) be a profile and p be an allocation that is ex
ante stable and SD-efficient among ex ante stable allocations. By Corollary 1, it suffices to show
that p is two-sided SD-efficient.
If p is not two-sided SD-efficient, there exists a cycle (i0, o0), (i1, o1), . . . , (ik, ok) such that
(i0, o0) = (ik, ok) and for all l = 1, . . . , k, ol ≻il ol−1, il−1 %ol−1 il, and p(il, ol−1) > 0 (cf.
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Dogan and Yildiz, 2016, Proposition 1). For ǫ ∈ (0,min{p(i, o) : i ∈ N and o ∈ O}), let q be
equal to p except that q(il, ol) = p(il, ol) + ǫ and q(il, ol−1) = p(il, ol−1) − ǫ for all l = 1, . . . , k.
Thus, agent il passes a fraction of ol−1 on to agent il−1. Note that q stochastically dominates p for
both sides and at least one agent i ∈ N strictly prefers q to p since preferences are strict.
We show that q is ex ante stable. Let i, j ∈ N and o ∈ O with i ≻o j and q(j, o) > 0. If
p(j, o) > 0, ex ante stability of p implies p(i, o′) = 0 for all o′ with o ≻i o
′. Since q(i) %SDi p(i),
it follows that q(i, o′) = 0 for all o′ with o ≻i o
′. Otherwise, j = il−1 and o = ol−1 for some
l = 1, . . . , k. Now p(il, ol−1) ≥ ǫ > 0 and il−1 %ol−1 il. It follows that i ≻ol−1 il. Since p is ex
ante stable, p(i, o′) = 0 for all o′ with ol−1 ≻ o
′. And again, since q(i) %SDi p(i), it follows that
q(i, o′) = 0 for all o′ with ol−1 ≻i o
′. So q is ex ante stable. Thus, p is not SD-efficient among ex
ante stable allocations, which contradicts the assumption.
Proposition 2. There may be no allocation that is claimwise stable and SD-efficient.
Proof. Consider the following instance.
≻1 : b a c
≻2 : a b c
≻3 : a b c
≻a : 1 3 2
≻b : 2 1 3
≻c : 2 1 3
The only deterministic stable allocation is the following one.
a b c( )
1 1 0 0
2 0 1 0
3 0 0 1
We show that it is also the only claimwise stable allocation. Consider any claimwise stable
allocation p. We first claim that p(2, a) = 0. If p(2, a) > 0, agent 1 will have a justified claim
against agent 2 for object a.
p =
a b c( )
1 ? ? ?
2 0 ? ?
3 ? ? ?
Next, we claim that p(1, b) = 0. Since p(2, a) = 0, agent 2 cannot let agent 1 get any part of b or
else 2 will have a justified claim against agent 1 for object b.
p =
a b c( )
1 ? 0 ?
2 0 ? ?
3 ? ? ?
We now claim that p(3, a) = 0. If p(3, a) > 0, then we know that p(1, b) = 0 so 1 cannot let 3
take any part of a or else it will have a justified claim against 3 for object a.
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p =
a b c( )
1 ? 0 ?
2 0 ? ?
3 0 ? ?
Since the matrix is bistochastic, we complete some columns and rows.
p =
a b c( )
1 1 0 0
2 0 ? ?
3 0 ? ?
Next, we argue that p(3, b) = 0. If p(3, b) > 0, then we know that p(2, b) = 0 so agent 2 will not
let 3 get any part of b or else 2 will have a justified claim against 3 for object b. Hence,
p =
a b c( )
1 1 0 0
2 0 ? ?
3 0 0 ?
We can now complete the matrix.
p =
a b c( )
1 1 0 0
2 0 1 1
3 0 0 1
We have established that p is the only claimwise stable allocation. However, it is not SD-efficient.
In particular, the allocation
a b c( )
1 0 1 0
2 1 0 0
3 0 0 1
SD-dominates p.
Proposition 4. No mechanism satisfies weak SD-strategyproofness, S-stability, and S-constrained
efficiency for S ∈ {ex ante, ex post, FS} even if preferences are strict.
Proof. In all profiles in the proof, the sets of S-stable allocations with be the same for S ∈
{ex ante, ex post, FS}. Thus, it will prove the statement for all three stability notions at once.
Let f be a mechanism that is weakly SD-strategyproof, S-stable, and S-constrained efficient.
Consider the following profile (≻N ,%O).
≻1 : b c a
≻2 : b c a
≻3 : a b c
%a : {1, 2} 3
%b : 3 {1, 2}
%c : 3 {1, 2}
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There are two S-stable and S-constrained efficient deterministic allocations.
a b c( )
1 0 1 0
2 0 0 1
3 1 0 0
a b c( )
1 0 0 1
2 0 1 0
3 1 0 0
Thus, all S-stable and S-constrained efficient allocations are of the following form. (Here we use
that the set of S-stable allocations in the same for all three stability notions.)
pα =
a b c( )
1 0 1− α α
2 0 α 1− α
3 1 0 0
for some α ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose f((≻N ,%O)) = p
α for some α > 0. Then, agent 1 can misreport by
swapping c and a resulting in the preferences ≻′N below.
≻′1 : b a c
≻′2 : b c a
≻′3 : a b c
S-stability and S-constrained efficiency imply that f((≻′N ,%O)) = p
0.
Note that p0(1) ≻SDi p
α and so agent 1 can successfully manipulate in the profile (≻N ,%O),
which contradicts strategyproofness of f . If 1 − α > 0, we can use a symmetric argument where
agent 2 misreports.
Example 3. Fractional stability is strictly weaker than ex post stability for weak priorities
and strict preferences. To see this, consider the following example. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
O = {a, b, c, d, e}, and cap(i) = 1 for all i ∈ N . The preferences and priorities are as follows.
≻1: c d e a b
≻2: c d e a b
≻3: a b d c e
≻4: a b c d e
≻5: a b c d e
%a: [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
%b: [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
%c: [3, 4, 5] [1, 2]
%d: [3, 4, 5] [1, 2]
%e: [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Then the allocation
p =
a b c d e



1 0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3
2 0 0 1/3 1/3 1/3
3 1/3 1/3 0 1/3 0
4 1/3 1/3 1/6 0 1/6
5 1/3 1/3 1/6 0 1/6
is fractionally stable, but not ex post stable.
To see that p is fractionally stable, observe that (fractional stability) holds for each agent-object
pair including agents 1 or 2 (since they have the lowest priority for each object) or objects a, b, or e
(since all agents have the same priority for those). For the remaining pairs, we note that agents 3,4,
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and 5 each receive probability 23 for objects they prefer to c and d and each of c and d is assigned
to agents {3, 4, 5} with probability 13 .
Next we argue that p is not ex post stable. Any decomposition of p into deterministic allocations
must contain a deterministic allocation p that assigns object e to agent 5. Neither 1 nor 2 can
receive c or d in p, since then (5, c) and (5, d) would be blocking pairs, respectively. Hence, p
assigns c to agent 4 and d to agent 3. On the other hand, p(i, a) = p(i, b) = 0 and so p cannot
assign a or b to agent 1. It follows that 1 remains unmatched in p, which violates stability of p.
Example 4. For each of our stability notions S, S-VER results in a different mechanism.
Consider again Example 3. One can check that the allocation p is the outcome of VER for
fractional stability. Hence, not only is fractional stability different from ex post stability, but it also
leads to different instantiation of VER.
VER for claimwise stability in Example 3 yields the following allocation.
a b c d e



1 0 0 1/2 3/10 1/5
2 0 0 1/2 3/10 1/5
3 1/3 1/3 0 2/15 1/5
4 1/3 1/3 0 2/15 1/5
5 1/3 1/3 0 2/15 1/5
Thus, VER for fractional stability and claimwise stability are different.
The following example shows that EAS-VER is different from ExpS-VER. Let N = {1, . . . , 8},
O = {a, . . . , h}, and cap(i) = 1 for all i ∈ N . We truncate the preferences to the part that is
relevant for computing ExpS-VER. All agents have the same priority for objects other than e.
≻1: a e g
≻2: a f g
≻3: b e g
≻4: b f g
≻5: c e h
≻6: c f h
≻7: d e h
≻8: d f h
%e: 1,3 5,7 2,4,6,8
ExpS-VER (as well as the probabilistic serial rule) yield the allocation shown below. Note that p
is not ex ante stable as agent 1 wants to get more of e and has higher priority for e than 5 and 7.
p =
a b c d e f g h



1 1/2 0 0 0 1/4 0 1/4 0
2 1/2 0 0 0 0 1/4 1/4 0
3 0 1/2 0 0 1/4 0 1/4 0
4 0 1/2 0 0 0 1/4 1/4 0
5 0 0 1/2 0 1/4 0 0 1/4
6 0 0 1/2 0 0 1/4 0 1/4
7 0 0 0 1/2 1/4 0 0 1/4
8 0 0 0 1/2 0 1/4 0 1/4
To see that p is ex post stable, we observe that it can be written as the uniform convex combination
of the following four deterministic stable allocations.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
( )a f b g e c h d
( )a g b f h c e d
( )g a e b c f d h
( )e a g b c h d f
Since p is ex post stable and coincides with the allocation produced by the probabilistic serial rule,
it is also the outcome of ExpS-VER. Since p is not ex ante stable, it cannot be the outcome of
EAS-VER.
B. Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Probabilistic Allocations
We examine for which stability notions the set of stable allocations forms a lattice when preferences
and priorities are strict. It only makes sense to talk about lattices if the join and the meet of two
allocations is defined. Our definition will be based on stochastic dominance. Given two allocations
p and q and an agent i ∈ N , we define p(i) ∨ (i) as the worst lottery that stochastically dominates
both p(i) and q(i) based on i’s preferences. That is, for o ∈ O, we have∑
o′%io
(p(i) ∨ q(i))(o′) = max{
∑
o′%io
p(i)(o′),
∑
o′%io
q(i)(o′)}
Note that this unique defines p(i) ∨ q(i). Likewise, we define p(i) ∧ q(i) as the best lottery that is
stochastically dominated by both p(i) and q(i). This means that∑
o′%io
(p(i) ∧ q(i))(o′) = min{
∑
o′%io
p(i)(o′),
∑
o′%io
q(i)(o′)}
The join and meet of p and q are defined as the agent-wise join and meet, that is, (p ∨ q)(i) =
p(i) ∨ q(i) and (p ∧ q)(i) = p(i) ∧ q(i) for all i. The join and meet of two allocations do not in
general result in a valid allocation.
We can now ask for which stability notions, the set of stable allocations forms a lattice when
meet and join are defined as above. Frist, Alkan and Gale (2003, Theorem 5) showed that even
for more general preference structures, the set of ex ante stable allocations forms a lattice. One
can derive this result more easily in our setting, for example, by using the fact that in any ex ante
stable allocation, each object can only be assigned to two agents with positive probability (Schlegel,
2018).
Proposition 5. The set of ex ante stable allocations with ∨ and ∧ is a lattice.
It turns out that the ex post stable allocations also form a lattice. Since ex post stability and
fractional stability coincide for strict preferences and priorities, we get the same conclusion for
fractional stability.
Proposition 6. If preferences and priorities are strict, the set of ex post stable allocations with
∨ and ∧ is a lattice.
Proof. First we prove an auxiliary statement which shows that every stable allocation can be
decomposed in a specific way. Let p =
∑k
l=1 λlp
l be an ex post stable allocation, written as a
convex combination of deterministic stable allocations. We show that we can write p as a convex
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combination of deterministic stable allocations ql such that ql(i) %i q
l+1(i) for all i ∈ N and
l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}.
Since the set of deterministic stable allocations forms a lattice, we have that two deterministic
stable allocations p′ and q′,
p′ + q′ = p′ ∨ q′ + p′ ∧ q′ (2)
We use this to show by induction that
k∑
l=1
pl = p1 ∨ p2 + (p1 ∧ p2) ∨ p3 + (p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3) ∨ p4 + · · ·+ p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pk
=
k−1∑
l=1
((
l∧
m=1
pm
)
∨ pl+1
)
+
k∧
l=1
pl
When k = 1, there is noting to how. Now let k ≥ 2 and assume the statement holds up to k − 1.
Applying the induction hypothesis, we get
k∑
l=1
pl =
k−2∑
l=1
((
l∧
m=1
pm
)
∨ pl+1
)
+
k−1∧
l=1
pl + pk
=
k−2∑
l=1
((
l∧
m=1
pm
)
∨ pl+1
)
+
(
k−1∧
l=1
pl
)
∨ pk +
(
k−1∧
l=1
pl
)
∧ pk
=
k−1∑
l=1
((
l∧
m=1
pm
)
∨ pl+1
)
+
k∧
l=1
pl
where we use (2) for the second equality.
Let q1, . . . , qk be the summands on the right hand side of the last term in the above sequence of
equations. Then with λ∗ = minl λl, we can write
p =
k∑
l=1
(λl − λ
∗)pl + λ∗ql
By construction, pl(i) %i q
k(i) and ql(i) %i q
k(i) for all l and i. By applying this step repeatedly,
we can split off one allocation after another from p until we get the desired representation. For
example, in the second iteration, we apply the previous reasoning to p− λ∗qk.
Now it is easy to show that the set of ex post stable allocations forms a lattice. Let p, q be two ex
post stable allocations. By the auxiliary statement, we can write p =
∑k
l=1 λlp
l and q =
∑k
l=1 λlq
l,
where all pl and ql are deterministic stable allocations and for all i ∈ N and l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1},
pl(i) %i p
l+1(i) and ql(i) %i q
l+1(i). (Note that we may assume without loss of generality that both
decompositions have the same number of deterministic allocations and the same coefficients λl by
allowing duplicates.) Thus, we have
p ∨ q =
(
k∑
l=1
λlp
l
)
∨
(
k∑
l=1
λlq
l
)
=
k∑
l=1
λl(p
l ∨ ql)
where for the second equality, we use the fact that the pl and ql are ordered in decreasing order
of preferences uniformly over agents. The allocations pl ∨ ql are deterministic stable allocations.
Thus, it follows that p ∨ q is ex post stable. The analogous argument goes through for p ∧ q.
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The lattice structure of the set of ex post stable allocations has likewise be proved by
Jua´rez, Neme, and Oviedo (2020) for many-to-many matchings. Their proof also proceeds by de-
composing stable allocations into deterministic stable allocations that decrease in order of pref-
erence uniformly over agents, as the auxiliary statement in the first part of the proof of Propo-
sition 6 allows us to do. Alternatively, one can obtain this decomposition from the results of
Sethuraman, Teo, and Qian (2006).
Lastly, we provide an example which shows the set of claimwise stable allocations is not a lattice
for our definitions of join and meet.
Example 5. Consider three agents N = {1, 2, 3} and three objects O = {a, b, c} with the following
preferences and priorities.
1 : a b c
2: b a c
3: c a b
a : 3 2 1
b : 1 3 2
c : 2 1 3
The fractional allocations p and q below are claimwise stable. We can see this by observing that
every agent gets their most preferred object with probability 1/2 in both allocations while having
the lowest priority for that object. So given agents i, j and an object o with i ≻o j, we know that
o is not i’s most preferred object and thus,
∑
o′≻io
p(i, o′) ≥ 1/2 ≥ p(j, o), and similarly for q. The
join pˇ of p and q is not a valid allocation, since it gives object a to all three agents with probability
1/2, which is impossible.
p =

 1/2 0 1/21/2 1/2 0
0 1/2 1/2

 q =

 1/2 1/2 00 1/2 1/2
1/2 0 1/2

 pˇ =

 1/2 1/2 01/2 1/2 0
1/2 0 1/2


C. The Vigilant Priority Rule
36
Draft – August 21, 2020
Algorithm 2 Vigilant Priority
Input: A preference profile %N , a non-empty and closed set X of allocations and permutation
σ over N
Output: An allocation p ∈ X
1 k ←− 0 (k is the round of the algorithm)
2 N ′ ←− N (the set of active agents)
3 π0(i, E)←− 0 for all i ∈ N and E ∈ Ei
4 while N ′ 6= ∅ do
5 for i ∈ N ′ according to order σ do
6 Fi ←− {E ∈ Ei : there is p ∈ X so that p(j, E
′) ≥ πk(j, E′) for all j ∈ N and E′ ∈
Ej , p(i, E) > π
k(i, E), and p(j, Ej) > π
k(j, Ej) for all j ∈ N
′ with j < i and Fj 6= ∅}
7 if Fi 6= ∅ then
8 Ei ←− max%i Fi
9 else
10 N ′ ←− N ′ \ {i}
11 end if
12 end for
13 Compute δ∗ as follows
δ∗ = max δ s.t.
p(i, Ei) ≥ π
k(i, Ei) + δ ∀i ∈ N
′ (agent i eats Ei)
p(i, E) ≥ πk(i, E) ∀i ∈ N and E ∈ Ei (p extends π
k)
p ∈ X (p is feasible)
14 πk+1(i, Ei)←− π
k(i, Ei) + δ
∗ for all i ∈ N ′
15 πk+1(i, E)←− πk(i, E) for all i ∈ N and E = Ei \ {Ei}
16 k ←− k + 1
17 end while
18 return p (as computed in Line 13)
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